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This thesis places at the centre of its attention the members of the International Law 
Department (ILD) of the Israeli military. Its point of departure is the 2008/2009 Israeli 
offensive in the Gaza strip, a military operation which caused extensive loss of lives. During 
this offensive, the Israeli military made unprecedented use of the ILD.  
This dissertation sets out to examine the dynamic processes through which extreme violations 
of human rights, and most fundamentally, the right to life, are negotiated and authorized by 
these expert practitioners of international law. This exploration is methodologically based on 
interviews with ILD members and discourse analysis and is grounded in concepts and tools of 
critical legal theory, organisation studies and debates of morality. The findings of the thesis 
reveal that, in the case of the ILD team, International Humanitarian Law, organisational 
structures of the military and perceptions of morality play a role in enabling the execution of 
extreme violence and extensive violation of the right to life. Moreover, these same structures 
and conditions hinder the possibility of assigning responsibility for lives lost. 
Building on the case study of the ILD of the Israeli military, the dissertation seeks to further 
understanding of the dynamics between law, organisational structures and morality as they 
relate to the legal work of practitioners in contemporary warfare. Ultimately, the thesis 
demonstrates that existing tools are insufficient in protecting the right to life, and aspires to 
contribute to the assignment of legal and moral responsibility for loss of lives. 
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In December 2008, following an extended period of tension and mutual violence, Israel 
launched a massive offensive in the Gaza Strip; the attack lasted three weeks and, according 
to estimates, resulted in the death of 1,389 Palestinians, among these 759 civilians 
(B’Tselem, 2011). Thousands more were injured, and there was considerable damage to 
buildings and infrastructure.  
Israel's offensive drew extensive criticism in light of extreme violations of human rights law; 
it was also argued that the military operation severely violated international humanitarian law 
(IHL). During the operation, as well as in its aftermath, official Israeli spokespersons made 
extensive reference to IHL principles, claiming that Israel had, in fact, abided by these 
principles in its actions. Within the military, the chief body responsible for the application of 
IHL is the International Law Department (ILD), which is composed of legal experts, 
specialists in International Law. During the offensive and throughout the preparations for it, 
the military made unprecedented use of this department (Blau and Feldman, 2009).  
As information about the extensive involvement of the ILD team in the military operation 
began to spread, questions were raised in regard to the affect IHL had over military decision 
making in this case. Public, journalistic and academic discussions aimed to evaluate and 
examine the role of law in relation to warfare. Questions debated in this regard were, for 
instance, whether legal rhetoric was simply used as lip-service; to what extent does political 
power shaped military legal interpretation; whether law actually contributed to the 
proliferation of violence, and, of course, whether Israel violated law in its actions. While 
these are indeed crucial questions, these existing accounts still leave many questions 
unanswered.  
 
The aim of this research 
This thesis places at the centre of its attention the group of individual members of the ILD 
team. It sets out to examine the dynamic processes through which extreme violations of 
human rights, and most fundamentally, the right to life, are negotiated and authorized by 
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these expert practitioners of international law. Based on this case, I seek to further 
understanding of the dynamics between law, organisational structures and morality as they 
relate to the legal practice of the team members. Finally, this thesis aims to investigate the 
issue of legal and moral responsibility for loss of lives.   
 
Research questions: 
All questions pertain to the work of the ILD team - in and around the 2008/9 offensive 
in Gaza, and in more general terms: 
1. How are IHL principles of distinction and proportionality interpreted and applied by 
the ILD team?  
2. In terms of the extreme violations of human rights negotiated and authorized by 
members of the ILD team, the most fundamental violation is of the right to life, and in 
light of this it is necessary to examine: 
a. How do ILD team members perceive their position, as legal advisors and employees 
in the military organization? 
b. How do ILD team members perceive the role of moral and ethical considerations to 
their work?  
3. How can the conclusions of my particular investigation of the intersection of law, 
organizational aspects and morality be understood in relation to legal notions of 
responsibility? 
 
This paper examines ILD practitioners’ work in avenues of critical legal theory, organisation 
studies and morality. Grounded in findings and theory, it will show how IHL, organisational 
structures of the military and perceptions of morality play a role in enabling the execution of 
extreme violence and extensive violation of the right to life. Moreover, these same structures 
and conditions hinder the possibility of assigning responsibility for lives lost. 
   
Chapter overview:  
This thesis begins with a section describing the analytical framework I will employ. This 
includes review and debate of the three theoretical paths which this thesis will use. Following 
this, I include a section describing methodology, which reviews my main methods of 
research, and explains the link between my method and research questions. The first chapter 
will describe and examine the ILD team’s interpretation and application of two pillars of 
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IHL, the principles of distinction and proportionality. It will then discuss the complex ways in 
which law interacts with war. The second chapter will apply tools of organisation theory to 
the team, and attempt to provide insight into how decision making processes correspond with 
the violation of the right to life. The third chapter will revisit previous chapters’ discussions 
and conclusions regarding law and organisation in order to consider the issue of 





This thesis seeks to further understanding and analysis of the dynamics between law, 
organisation and morality in the legal practice of a team military, grounded in perceptions of 
individuals who are members of the team. In accordance with these aims, this research is 
based on three main theoretical paths:  
a. Review and analysis of IHL: as this law provides tools for the work of the ILD team, a 
legal discussion will provide basis for an evaluation of decisions made by team members. 
Critical perspectives on law point out its limits and shortcomings in protections it lends to 
lives.  
b. Organisation theory: conceptualisation of the team as part of an organisation (the military) 
sheds light on the ways in which legal advice is formulated and decided upon. In this frame, 
emphasis is given to theory which aims to understand how perceptions of individuals are 
created and maintained within an organisational structure. I also use theory discussing the 
dynamics between employees and encompassing organisational structure.  
c. Morality, law and war: theoretical accounts regarding the relations of morality to law, and 
those of morality to war will clarify how these interconnections in the work of the ILD 
practitioners. A main question debated in this regard is whether morality can further 
protection of lives.    
 
a. International Humanitarian Law, its interpretation and influence on war 
International Humanitarian Law 
The principles of IHL were mostly codified in the 1907 Hague Convention and regulations, 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its 1977 additional Protocols. Most fundamentally, this 
law, rather than addressing matters regarding the infliction of war and conflict (Jus ad 
bellum) regulates state conduct in times of war (Jus in bello):   
Making no claim that it can put an end to the scourge of war, humanitarian law aims to 
attenuate the unnecessary harshness of war. The reciprocal interests of the belligerents also 




One of the fundamental critical debates on IHL revolves around the implications of an 
established legal frame for war per se; whether this law, in fact, legitimizes war and counters 
efforts to abolish it. In regard to this claim, Pictet (ibid) presents a common-sense argument: 
wars occur and therefore law is needed:  
…as long as governments maintain vast armies, even for defensive purposes, and thereby 
demonstrate that they do not believe war to be impossible, people attenuating the evils of war 
cannot shirk the duty of encouraging the adoption of safeguards while there is still time (82) 
Differently from Pictet’s ‘defence’ for IHL, researchers such as David Kennedy (2006) and 
Eyal Weizman (2009) critically reflect on the implications of a legal frame to war. In this 
context, one of the main critiques is that this law, in practice, does not simply provide ‘set 
rules,’ hence limiting the use of force. Rather, it shapes and designs ‘allowed’ and acceptable 
violence   
While IHL covers a wide range of topics, this thesis will focus on two fundamental legal 
principles, most crucial for the debate on the right to life in war: 
- The distinction between civilian population and combatants, one of the pillars of IHL, 
wherein civilians are to be protected from war, and combatants are legitimate target of 
hostilities:  
The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations; the civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. (Article 51, of the additional Protocol I 
of 1977)   
In reflecting on the categories of combatant and civilian, Geoffrey Best (1984) argues that 
while ‘the civilian’ in the law of war is a product of seventeenth and eighteenth century 
European perceptions of war, it has nevertheless remained analytically fixed in legal research, 
regardless of vast changes in realities of war. Best continues by illustrating various 
complications to the application of this concept which arise in combat. Best, however, 
neglects to address the power dynamics involved in drawing the line which separates 
civilians from combatants. Hugo Slim (2003) further develops analysis of the civilian as a 
contested concept in social, historical, theological and political contexts. In elaborately 
discussing rejections of the civilian category, Slim debates various discourses negating this 
concept, and in this sense complements Best’s writing.   
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As Karma Nablusi (2001) points out, the legal distinction between civilians and combatants 
should be viewed in historical context; the earlier Hague Conventions were mainly concerned 
with the regulation of violence between states’ combatants. In this, the aim of legal 
differentiation between categories of combatants and civilians was a distinction between 
lawful combatants, to which the law would apply, from unlawful ones, who were not meant 
to be covered by this law. Differently, the later Geneva Conventions, in particular the fourth 
of these, largely dealt with a distinction aimed to promote the protection of civilians in war. 
This account is analytically significant for this thesis because in historicizing the combatant 
and civilian it reveals the ambiguous character of these categories. This perspective, in turn, 
sheds light on the ‘battle’ legal practitioners undertake in this regard. 
In legal terms, an exception to the civilian protection occurs in specific temporal and combat-
related circumstances: at a time in which a civilian directly participates in hostilities. In these 
instances, s/he becomes a legitimate target of attack. Questions regarding the application of 
this exception, i.e. the time frame in which protection is lost and what constitutes ‘direct 
participation’ are, unsurprisingly, highly controversial.    
- Based on the distinction between combatants and civilians, the law forbids attacks 
which do not discriminate between these two categories of persons. In outlining 
indiscriminate attacks, law creates an equation of proportion: an attack is illegal if its 
expected incidental damage to civilians is excessive in relation to its predicted military 
gain:   
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited; Among others, the following types of attacks are to be 
considered as indiscriminate […] an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
(Article 51, of the additional Protocol I of 1977)   
 
The protections of civilian lives in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law 
IHL and human rights are similar in that both these legal systems share the goal of 
safeguarding lives; however, the nature and extent of these protections are substantially 
different. While in human rights the right to life is paramount, within the frame of IHL, in 
accordance with the principles of distinction and proportionality, harm to people, even those 
uninvolved in combat, and even their killing are not necessarily illegal.   
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A fundamental difference between the legal systems lies in the subjects of law:  
…there exists a real and meaningful difference between the normative frameworks of human 
rights law and humanitarian law. The difference rests on the fact that human rights law is 
centred, indeed built, on the granting of rights to the individual, while humanitarian law is 
focused on the direct imposition of obligations on the individual (Provost, 2002, 13) 
Provost’s distinction is interesting in the gap it dismisses, namely, the individual assumed in 
each legal frame. In relating to human rights, the ‘individual’ is a wide category, but in the 
context of IHL, this concept is clearly different. This ‘individual’ then is seemingly a 
combatant or policy-maker. Indeed, this gap demonstrates a more general matter: while 
human rights aim to define entitlements and protections of persons, IHL largely seeks to 
regulate the actions of entities waging war.  
An additional central comparative aspect between legal systems lies in the circumstances of 
their application. In this, some regard human rights as a regulating system for relationships 
between individuals and states of jurisdiction only in times of peace and IHL, on the other 
hand, law regulating relations between sides to war, and the exclusive applicable law at these 
times (Provost, 2002). However, this mutually exclusive application is certainly not agreed 
upon (Scobbie, 2010).  
b. Organisation theory  
Organisational theory is a relatively new yet diverse social-scientific field, its changes and 
developments reflecting shifts which emerged in the wider area of social science over the last 
few decades (Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2003).  
Edward Rubin (2005) divides organisation theory into four types: a. that which views 
organisation as a nexus of contracts; b. that which sees organisations as complex decision-
making hierarchies; c. that which analyses organisations as organisms or complex systems 
and d. that which emphasizes broader social impact on organisations.  
The first type of theory, focused on a nexus of contracts, is grounded in contractual 
obligations of individuals and entities, and in essence assumes rationality. Rationality is 
crucial in this because contracts provide a sound ground for analysis only as far as they 
coherently reflect choice and course of action among relevant actors. This theory is limited, 
as in its emphasis of contracts it does not sufficiently consider the impact of individuals on 
the organisational picture. Additionally, this type of theory is inadequate for the purposes of 
8 
 
this thesis because in its focus on contractual relations, it de-facto disregards the organisation 
as an entity which may affect or shape dynamics.   
The second theoretical type in Rubin’s division is decision theory, a perspective focused on 
decision-making processes, and in these, factors which hinder rationality. This approach is 
more complex than theory based exclusively on contracts, because while it is similarly based 
on rational assumptions, it also takes into account additional elements of human behaviour 
and structural obstacles. But this theory is nevertheless inadequate for the purposes of this 
dissertation; firstly, because in its emphasis on contracts and obstacles to these it fails to take 
into account the organisation itself as a substantial analytical factor. Furthermore, and 
crucially for the context of this thesis, this theory does not account for the complex ways in 
which organisational structure interrelates with the thought, opinions, and ideologies of 
individuals. 
The third theory type, which uses the metaphor of an organism or system to describe the 
organisation, is fundamentally different from the first two types of theory in that it places the 
organisation itself as a central factor in its analysis. A central attribute of this theory is that it 
assumes organisational processes occur mostly in coordination of different ‘organs’. This 
theoretical approach is embedded in functionalist assumptions, which are problematic in that 
a given situation is seen as ‘natural’ or necessary. This does not account for conflict and 
struggle within the organisation. Additionally, this theory, similarly to the other theory types 
mentioned thus far, does not construct a frame useful for organisational analysis which seeks 
to understand the complex dynamics between individuals and structure.   
The fourth theory type in Rubin’s division focuses on broader social context and culture, in 
two possible ways: one is an emphasis of the organisation’s broader societal and 
environmental contexts. This view, even if important in bringing ‘the world’ into the analysis, 
does not provide much insight regarding the organisation as such. In this sense, this theory 
brings in society, but takes out the organisation. A second possible research path focused on 
society and culture would analyze the organisation itself as an entity which encompasses and 
produces culture, in broad social and political contexts. In the frame of this theory, both 
society and the organisation are analytically significant factors. This approach, in its 
emphasis on the production of meaning in the organisation, is most useful in analyzing this 
concept as a field composed of interaction between individuals and structure, and for this 
reason it will serve as the theoretical basis for this research.  
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Organisation and the construction of meaning 
Czarniawska-Joerges (1992) proposes a definition to the organisation which explains how 
meaning and decision are constructed, based on both individual action and structure (net): 
Organisations are nets of collective action, undertaken in an effort to shape the world and 
human lives. The contents of the action are meanings and things (artifacts). One net of 
collective action is distinguishable from one another by the kind of meaning and products 
socially attributed to a given organisation. (32) 
And so, the fourth type of theory in Rubin’s division and the organisation in Czarniawska-
Joerges’ definition pave the way for discussions analyzing the dynamics between the 
individual and organisation as a process which produces meaning and action. These 
theoretical paths link to the field of interpretive research in organisational theory. Interpretive 
approaches examine the ways in which groups and the individuals within them develop, as 
well as express and communicate meaning within an organisational context (Hatch and 
Yanow, 2005).  
Gareth Morgan (1997) suggests an explanation for the ways in which meanings are created 
and assigned in an organisational context:  
Organisational structure, rules, policies, goals, missions, job-descriptions, and standardized 
operating procedures (…) act as primary points of reference for the way people think about 
and make sense of the contexts in which they work (…) they are cultural artifacts shaping the 
ongoing reality (139-140)   
Thus, contracts and other written objects and verbal interactions, as these are used by 
members of the organisation, play a central part in the construction of meaning.  
Karl Weick (1995) further explores this theoretical path and examines a process of meaning 
production, which he calls “sense-making”. In this light, Weick describes the course in which 
situations are socially negotiated, constructed and reconstructed. The process of sense-
making, Weick argues, is practiced in any social interaction, but is different in the context of 
the organisation. Difference lies in that on one hand, organisations, by definition, facilitate 
coordinated action and in this impose, surface-level influence, and also by an “invisible 
hand” of sense-making. However, and unlike many other social interactions which are often 
taken for granted (such as the state, the family), organisational frames are generally 
questioned and debated. Organisations as workplaces, in this sense, bring forth many 
occasions which invoke explanation, justification and rationalization. To illustrate, within 
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workplaces it is quite common that employees question, criticize and negotiate the definition 
of their positions and corresponding fields of responsibility.  
Hence, sense-making is a significant theoretical tool, because in conceptualising the 
construction of meaning it lays the ground for a discussion in the complex relations between 
individuals, members of the organisation, and the organisational structure. Individuals relate 
to the organisational structure, its rules, regulations and goals in complex ways as they 
formulate meaning and perceptions. What this theory is lacking, however, is a more thorough 
consideration of the possibility that the individual and structure are not entirely distinct and 
separable in the process of sense-making. Weick indeed considers the organisation’s 
“invisible hand” in creating meaning, but even this image demonstrates separateness: the 
organisation’s ‘hand’ reaches and shapes perceptions; the ‘organisation’, then, is external to 
individuals, whom each hold independent views of the organisations and its actions.  
The individual and the system 
The dynamics between individual and organisation also referred to as agency and structure, 
are of great importance in the field of organisation theory. This matter is pertinent because 
different definitions of these relations encompass significant assumptions as to humanity and 
society and concepts such as identity, freedom of thought and responsibility (Reed, 1995). 
Based on the work of Herbert Marcuse, David Held (1980) explores the position of 
individuals within systems. He enquires who is a ‘good employee’, and how he is different 
from a ‘good person’. Held suggests that the employee is measured and evaluated on the 
basis of rules and agenda of the organisation. These alternative frames, he argues, repress 
critical thinking:  
Propositions concerning production, effective organisation, the rules of the game, business 
methods, use of science and technique, are judged true of false according to whether or not 
the ‘means’ to which they refer are suitable or applicable (for an end which remains, of 
course, unquestioned) (67)  
In discussing the interplay between structure and individual, Morgan (1997) presents the 
metaphor of a psychic prison. This notion, based on Plato’s allegory of the cave, describes a 
situation in which perceptions of reality are distorted: looking outwards from within the cave, 
false apprehensions are regarded and maintained as truth and fact. The cave allegory is 
illuminating in explaining the way in which position affects perspective and action, but this 
insight as applied to the organisation is imperfect. Imperfection is clear if recalling Weick’s 
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argument in regard to employees in an organisation: they commonly tend to question and 
criticize their roles, positions and the goals of the organisation. In this sense, the cave 
allegory provides only a partial explanation of the positions and actions of individuals 
working for an organisation.  
Reed (1995) argues that while some approaches in organisational theory reduce one end of 
the structure/agency equation, it is pertinent to understand these concepts in relation to one 
another: both significant components which are interrelated yet separable and constitute 
interplay of social action and structural constraint.              
Organisational theory applied to a military legal team 
Laura Dickinson (2010), in her innovative research, applies the framework of organisational 
theory to explore battlefield compliance with international law in the case of the U.S. military 
lawyers in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG). In this context, Dickinson seeks to 
isolate and examine organisational features which influence adherence to, or violation of, 
law. As Dickinson points out, compliance with domestic law is researched in varied avenues 
and frames such as psychology, sociology, legitimacy and social acceptance. Studies on 
compliance with international law, however, tend to remain in the realm of ‘the state’ as an 
actor, and avoid closer, more complex accounts of individuals, networks and circumstances.  
Despite its potential, Dickinson’s research is limited, mainly in that it does not adequately 
address the broadness of legal codes of war. In its account of practitioners’ legal work, the 
research largely debates compliance vs. non compliance rather than examining the nature of 
legal decisions made. Consequently, the research, unfortunately, does not use organisation 
theory to understand the precise nature of effect this context has over legal work.  
c. Morality, law and war 
The naturalist and positivist traditions  
An examination of law and morality necessarily relates to the origins of law, the traditions of 
naturalism and positivism. The naturalist school assumes that the origin of law is outside of 
the will of mankind, whether it lies in ‘nature’, ‘divine law’ or morality. This theoretical path 
is grounded in the legal model of Aristotle, which links social organisation with human 
capacities, needs and, ultimately, the will to survive. Aristotle, however, does not assume that 
‘nature’ provides a full explanation for legal systems, and this is because the element of 
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‘justice’ also plays a part in shaping law. This perception evolved to various schools of 
thought, but a main tradition within this theoretical school assumes that the authority of law is 
ultimately based on its connection to morality (Feinberg and Coleman, 2003).        
Positivism, differently, assumes human discretion as the source of legal systems. In this, 
morality is a part of law insofar as it had been incorporated into law by political authority; 
hence, there is no inherent connection between these concepts. In contemporary legal 
systems, however, it is common that legal argumentation relies on some combination of these 
two schools of thought (Rubin, 1997). 
Law and morality in war 
 
Richard Norman (1995) makes a key contribution to the field of ethics and war in criticizing 
accepted codes and practices of combat, primarily regarding killing. His critique relies on an 
analysis of what he considers an irreconcilable tension between every-day understandings of 
moral codes and those applied during war. Norman’s fundamental challenge is simple yet 
convincing: how can the frame of war, he asks, justify killing, an utterly unacceptable act in 
everyday life, and make it morally defensible? While this stand is indeed illuminating, its 
weakness lies in limited correlation with the realities of contemporary war patterns.  
 
As Martin Shaw (2005) demonstrates in his ‘Risk-Transfer’ analysis in regard to 
contemporary Western warfare, in realities of war, not only is killing acceptable, it even 
violates the principle of prioritizing the lives of those not involved in combat. In this war, 
much of the risk is transferred to the ‘enemy’: while the lives of Western soldiers are to be 
defended, the other side of the conflict is left to pay an even higher price, in the form of 
civilian casualties. Shaw then argues that it would be extremely difficult to morally defend 
these combat patterns. 
 
In the Israeli context, Amos Yadlin and Asa Kasher (2005) indeed took upon themselves to 
deal with these exact difficulties. The writers published a highly controversial legal doctrine 
for war, which they defined as an ethical revision of IHL, adapted to the context of terror and 
a-symmetrical warfare. In the frame of this doctrine, the immorality of terror is ultimately a 
justification for the reformulation of legal codes. One of the core elements of this doctrine, in 
essence, dissembles the legal principle of distinction between civilians and combatants.  
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Gabriella Blum (2010), former member of the Israeli ILD, further discusses tension between 
morality and IHL. Blum suggests that there are situations in which legal instructions are 
immoral to an extent which calls for a fundamental re-examination of this law. A ‘lesser-evil’ 
solution to some war-related dilemmas, she argues, lies in violation of the codes of this law. 
Blum’s suggestion is dangerous if taking into account the inherent flexibility of IHL, 
moreover, this position entrusts exaggerated faith in the moral judgment of parties to war 







This chapter will explain and debate methodological choices made in this research; it will 
explain the compatibility of methodology to research questions, describe data collection and 
analysis carried out and discuss the limitations of choices made. Main methodologies used in 
this research are interviews and discourse analysis. Throughout the research, these paths are 
used both separately and intertwined with one another.  
 
a. Interviews with ILD team members: advantages and challenges  
As the aim of this research is to further understanding of violations to the right to life based 
on the case study of the Israeli ILD team, interviews with individuals who are present or past 
members of this team are the optimal methodological choice. These provide new first-hand 
knowledge and perspectives on the practice of law in relation to violent events. Interviews 
also allow access to the decision-making processes leading to legal decisions, by discussing 
real-time considerations and dynamics which underlie the practice of law. 
This research area is highly sensitive, due to the general nature of military decision-making 
as well as the specific case of the Israeli offensive in Gaza, which is of particular interest in 
this paper; the debate on alleged violations of IHL in Gaza still continues, as do campaigns 
aimed to promote international legal proceedings. As can be expected in light of this 
sensitivity, obtaining consent of team members to give interviews was challenging. Both 
formal and informal channels were used to reach informants: I obtained contact details of 
legal advisors with the help of a journalist and then contacted several people, past and present 
members of the team; I had also filed an official request for interviews through the military 
spokesperson’s office. Initially only one person responded to my request and agreed to be 
interviewed, while others refused or postponed their reply. The situation somewhat changed 
after I met with Israeli academics who research similar fields. Academics gave me contact 
details for more potential informants, and I then succeeded to schedule additional interviews. 
Finally I also received a positive response from official military channels, which led to 
another interview.      
Overall I held five interviews for the purpose of this thesis, lasting between one and 3.5 hours 
(the interview guide appears in an appendix). Four interviews were held in person, during a 
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visit to Israel, and one via phone, as I was then in the UK. Informants were both past and 
present members of the team, three were part of the team during the offensive in Gaza and 
two were not. Four of these interviews were recorded, and one was not, due to the preference 
of the informant.  
Notably, the interview process contributed to the final focus of the research. During this 
process, while I had been encouraged by the consent of team members to be interviewed, I 
also realised both the limitations and possibilities of this methodological choice. Firstly, my 
initial research was designed to exclusively explore legal advice concerning the offensive in 
Gaza, but this research goal proved to be unfeasible. This was mainly due to the mentioned 
sensitivity of the offensive. Additionally, in interviews, recent and present members of the 
team tended to express limited views and perspectives as compared to past team members 
and the latter did not take part in work revolving the offensive in Gaza.  
In light of these circumstances I decided to shift from an initial focus on Gaza to a broader 
review of the team and its work, thereby exploring the broader context within which the 
offensive in Gaza took place. As the interviews progressed, material gathered assisted me to 
develop the research in new directions. I was intrigued by team members’ positions on law, 
morality and their own role in war; I was also fascinated by organisational aspects of their 
work- for example, what are the implications of composing legal advice as employees in the 
military organisation? Do advisors consider morality a part of their job?; based on these 
newly generated interests, which arose from field-work, I modified the research questions, so 
that these will better correspond with directions of inquiry. I did not devise a new interview 
guide, because interviews were open-ended; as I aimed to best grasp perceptions of 
informants and gain insight into their discourse, I chose to raise open questions, and then 
allow them to express their thoughts, opinions and positions. 
Czarniawska-Joerges (1992) suggests conceptualization for research focused on perceptions 
and understandings of the actors who compose the field of inquiry:     
When approaching a cultural setting we are confronted with two alternatives only: One is to 
approach it through our own set of representations; another is to try to reach the 
representations held by the natives. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. The first is 
often regarded as more objective, because it is supposedly free from involvement. But it is 
free from involvement of one type only- the one that the actors have. (…) Nevertheless, the 
actors involved act upon their [Emphasis in original] representations, and not ours, however 
biased the former and correct the latter may be. In order to understand their actions we must 
understand their representations. (195)    
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Of course, informants left much unsaid. At times I could glance at the unrevealed; during one 
interview I had asked an informant if he was ever in the position of advocating the legality of 
a military action which he, in ‘real-time’, had advised against and regarded illegal. He smiled 
quirkily and said he could not answer my question. As the interview ended, however, he 
walked with me outside the building in which the interview took place, and then said “About 
what you asked before… sometimes we have to defend actions to which we objected” I asked 
if he could provide an example, and in this I, again, hit a wall. He replied “Let’s say…with 
Hassidic Jews. The state position is that they are not to be drafted to the army. I work for the 
state, so that is the position I have to advocate for, even if I my legal position is different…” 
Clearly, he was not talking about Hassidic Jews. This is an illustration, however, of the 
obstacles present in such sensitive research fields. A more general difficulty in this regard is 
in assessing the influence law has over warfare in practice; the thesis attempted to handle this 
obstacle, as others, in a careful manner.  
Analysis and interpretation of interviews aims to consider the varied perspectives of 
informants, rather than creating a single narrative that would allow for simpler 
argumentation. This is in accordance with an ethical obligation to present informants’ takes in 
a cautious manner. This approach follows Czarniawska-Joerges’ (ibid) research model: 1. 
Obtain actors’ accounts, which are elaborated enough to provide a basis for the understanding 
of standpoints. 2. Look at similarities between accounts, attempt to grasp the core of 
similarity; based on these similarities, try to understand ways of seeing the world, rather than 
a particular view. 3. Build a similar account for differences. 4. Attempt at building a story of 
phenomena and tie together varied versions and situations, even if they contradict one 
another. The result should be multifaceted, sharp, yet incomplete. 5. Avoid any one version 
of situations and events, or ‘leading’ accounts to fit a particular claim.      
Notably, choice of the ILD team members as informants and research focus, beyond exciting 
possibilities, also set limitations. Namely, this team is only a section within the state and 
military legal systems, and as such does not fully represent law within these bodies. In this 
sense, the shift from micro-level analysis of the team to macro conclusions in regard to law in 
war is limited, but this is not different than in any case study-based research.  
b. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a research method of law and the ILD team 
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Discourse analysis is, by definition, a diverse research method, as it seeks to constantly re-
examine and re-evaluate realities and power relations. What is common to research of this 
school, however, is an interest in language as it ‘naturally occurs’, the extension of linguistics 
to action and interaction and the social, cultural, situational and cognitive context of language 
use (Wodak and Meyer, 2009): 
CDA sees discourse - language use in speech and writing - as a form of ‘social practice’. 
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which 
frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is 
socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned- it constitutes situations, objects of 
knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of 
people. (…) Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of 
power. (258)    
The contribution of this research method to my own field of enquiry is pertinent because, in 
the case of the team, language and discourse interrelate with violence in a dialectical manner; 
violence shapes language, but language also shapes violence. The case study at hand provides 
a straightforward example as to the effect language has over political-social conditions, 
because the design of legal language shapes acts of warfare. The interpretive path which 
explores dialectics of language and social conditions is based on the work of Fairclough and 
Wodak (1997).   
Discourse analysis applied in this paper is also based on the analytical framework of Norman 
Fairclough (2001). This framework suggests that the first stage of research should be a focus 
on a social problem with a semiotic aspect. The social problem addressed by this research is 
the violation of the right to life, and semiotic aspect is the discursive formation of legal 
concepts and military structure and positions, which in turn provide an explanatory frame (of 
potential justification) for violence. Materials explored in this regard are interview texts and 
additional materials such as media releases, varied publications and recorded conferences.   
 
The thesis will make use of materials originated from sources different to the team, such as 
the report produced by the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict 
(UNHRC, 2009), known as the Goldstone Report, as well as publications produced by human 
rights NGOs and journalistic accounts. The intention in this is not to thoroughly explore 
different narratives of the offensive in Gaza, but to position the team’s account in relation to 




The second stage in Fairclough's framework is a discussion of obstacles which prevent ‘the 
problem from being tackled and resolved. In this, Fairclough suggests considering structures 
and networks of practices in which this problem is situated. In this paper, a main structure 
which creates an ‘obstacle’ is the legitimizing power of law. Another significant network is 
the military organisation. As this paper will further discuss, both military logic and the theory 
and practice of IHL provide frames in which legal language that justifies killing ‘makes 
sense’.  
 
Fairclough further suggests considering the relationship between semiotics and other 
elements of the practice debated. In this case, the correspondence of legal terms with the 
realities of war is intriguing. For example, as this paper will argue, the legal criteria of 
‘proportionality’, a balance between military goal and harm to civilians, entails a 
‘calculation’ that defies translation to language external to this legal discourse.  
 
In debating the semiosis of the discourse itself, an important feature in this is the way in 
which members of the team define their own position within the military structure. This 
position will be further debated, but an example to this is a semiotic feature which appeared 
in interviews: a tendency of team members to create a lingual division between “us”, 
referring to the team, and “them” referring to the military.  
 
Lastly, Fairclough's framework is focused on the question of whether the social order 'needs' 
the problem at hand. As this paper will argue, IHL and the military contribute to the 
legitimacy of the violation of the right to life. This legal engagement, in broader terms, serves 
to maximize military freedom of action, crucial within the logic of war.  
 
In conclusion, this research is methodologically based on interviews and critical discourse 
analysis, and utilizes secondary sources in the form of official documents, NGO reports and 
journalistic accounts. As this chapter had shown, these methodological choices are well 
grounded in research aims; furthermore, these choices assumed their final form as result of a 





Chapter 1: International Humanitarian Law, its interpretation and 
influence on war in the case of the International Law Department 
 
Background and structural position of the ILD  
The ILD, in its current form, was founded in the beginning of the 1990’s. The department 
team operates in offices located in ‘Ha’kirya’ military base in Tel Aviv, and includes 
approximately twenty officers. The team is subject to the authority of the IDF Military 
Advocate General Corps (MAG), the military legal system. The MAG is in charge of all legal 
inner-military matters, such as the incorporation of legal norms to the military and law 
enforcement among soldiers. Within the military structure it is separate from operational 
branches. For this reason, legal officers who are members of the ILD team are not 
hierarchically subordinate to decision-making commanders. The team has an advisory role, 
not that of command. As has been made public in journalistic accounts, and confirmed in 
interviews, the department is undergoing a continuing process of expansion and increasing 
involvement in military decision making. With this in mind, the 2008/2009 offensive in Gaza, 
in which legal advisors were more involved as compared to past operations, was not an 
exception, but a demonstration of a wider trend.   
Legal advisors’ interpretation and application of the IHL principles of distinction and 
proportionality 
One would never even contemplate or imagine not acting in accordance with law (…) 
everyone understands that [they must, M.G.] operate according to law (Judge Advocate 
General Avihai Mandelblit in Turkel Committee, 2010: 7) 
 
The principle of distinction in practice  
The distinction between civilians and combatants, one of the pillars of IHL, provides a basis 
for this legal frame and for the protection of civilians. For this reason, the nature of 
differentiation between civilians and combatants as applied by members of the legal team is 
crucial. Most significant for the perspective of this paper are the characteristics of this 
‘civilian’, entitled to the protections which this definition encompasses, and consequently, 
characteristics of persons excluded from the civilian category. Therefore, I will assess legal 
interpretations of ILD team members as compared to analytical debate focused on the content 




Case study: the ‘police line-up’ in view of the principle of distinction  
In the morning of Saturday, December 27 2008, Israel launched its offensive in Gaza. The 
first target of this military campaign had later become known as the ‘policemen line-up’. In 
this attack, Israeli air forces fired three missiles at the Arafat City Police Station yard, in the 
city Gaza; According to the Goldstone Report 
1
(2009: 121), forty eight policemen died on the 
spot, five more were injured, two of whom subsequently died. A few seconds later, either one 
or two more missiles were fired at a second nearby yard, causing the death of twenty eight 
additional people.  
The line-up policemen: civilians or combatants?  
In order to conclude whether or not the ‘police line-up’ attack was legal in view of IHL, the 
status of police officers in Gaza must be considered. In this context, a senior member of the 
ILD team argued in a newspaper article, first, that Gazan police personnel are legitimate 
targets for an attack since, given an opportunity (for instance, following an Israeli offensive), 
they would fight against the Israeli military (Blau and Feldman, 2009). The Goldstone Report 
rejected this line of argument, stressing that as this is a theoretical assumption, it does not 
justify the police personnel’s loss of civilian protection. A second line of argument employed 
by ILD team members according to a media report (Fogelman, 2010) was based on more 
concrete allegations: that specific police officers, who were present in the line-up, were 
involved in Hamas military activity. To this argument, the Goldstone Report replies by 
stating that even a publication sponsored by the Israeli government only accuses some of the 
policemen with involvement in terrorist activity, while thirty four of the dead policemen are 
not linked to any such activity. If this is the case, the Goldstone Report argues, even if some 
of the policemen were to be rightly considered combatants, i.e. a legitimate target for attack, 
the action still fails the test of proportionality. A third and more general argument, which was 
made public in an official state publication (State of Israel, 2010), is that there is no division 
between police and military work in Gaza, and for this reason all policemen are to be 
                                                          
1
  The report produced by the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, i.e. the Goldstone 
Report, has stirred lively debates in Israel. Debates arose again as Judge Goldstone published an article in which 
he described some change in his stand regarding Israel’s compliance with law as compared to the report. This 
publication (available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-
israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html [accessed 29.5.11]), however, provided no new 
information as to concurrencies during the military operation.   
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considered combatants. In this regard, the Goldstone Report states that although it may be 
that some policemen were involved in military activity, the police force as a whole is not to 
be considered a military entity. 
The status of policemen in Gaza: police or “police”?  
According to media reports (Fogelman, 2010), out of a hundred targets attacked by Israeli 
artillery during the first day of the military operation, twenty four were police stations. By the 
time the operation’s artillery attacks were stopped, all sixty Gazan police stations had been 
struck. Subsequent official publications produced by the ILD team (State of Israel, 2009) 
argue that the Gaza police is to be considered a combatant entity, hence a legitimate target for 
military attack. In these official publications, Gazan police is repeatedly referred to as 
“police”, with quotation marks. These quotation marks do not signify any specific police 
squads; rather, in this account, Gaza has only a “police” and no police. 
The NGO B’Tselem- the Israeli information centre for human rights in the occupied 
territories chose, in essence, a mid-way classification of Gaza police personnel. While the 
organisation clearly states on its website that the police line-up attack should be investigated 
with regard to its adherence with the principle of distinction, the list of fatalities published on 
the organisation's website positioned the names of police men and women on a separate list, 
distinguished from both civilians and combatants. This division follows an ICRC publication 
(2009), which elaborately debates “direct participation,” i.e. the instances in which civilians 
lose their status as protected from being targeted in hostilities. Palestinian human rights NGO 
Al-Haq (2009) stated that based on its own research, police in Gaza is separate to military 
forces, and therefore police personnel were not a legitimate target for attack. The organisation 
further stressed that, while some police officers were indeed active members of armed 
groups, these were only a few.  
Controversy with regard to the appropriate application of the principle of distinction in the 
context of contemporary warfare is by no means unique to the Israeli-Palestinian case (for 
example see Dinstein 2004, Kanstroom 2003, Sassoli 2003). As suggested by Best’s (1984) 
account of difficulties in application of the civilian-combatant distinction, the translation of 
legal code into practice may not be straightforward at all times. Moreover, analytical debate 
shifts beyond practical difficulties in the prescriptions for the application of legal codes. 
Nablusi’s (2001) historical review of the development of the civilian and combatant legal 
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categories reveals the ongoing negotiation of definitions, a process that does not allow a static 
understanding of these terms.    
Two members of the ILD team gave accounts of the team's application of the principle of 
distinction. When compared, the accounts demonstrate different approaches to this legal 
code. The first account describes a straightforward application of the code: 
The question is- were they [the line-up policemen, M.G.] combatants or not? This is very 
much a factual question (…) had they come to me with this question I would say: here are the 
factual questions I need to look at- show me the role of these policemen, are they combatants 
who are also policemen? Then they are a legal target. Or are they helpless secular transport 
policemen, as then maybe they are not [a legitimate military target, M.G.] (Interview, 
9.12.10)  
The second account is very different, and demonstrates a "forward leaning" approach to legal 
advice. Notably, it is by the head of the team at the time of the Gaza offensive, who states: 
The principle of distinction is, by definition, flexible. It requires that you make a distinction 
between a military target that is legitimate for attack, and a civilian object, that is illegal for 
you to set as a target. Now, what is a military target? (…) this is very flexible. A civilian 
object, when it is used [for military purpose, M.G.], or because of its location, or even 
because of its potential use (…) becomes a legitimate target of attack (Pnina Sharvit-Baruch 
in the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Conference, 2009) 
The position articulated by Sharvit-Baruch sheds light on the guiding interpretive principles 
of the civilian category applied by members of the team during the offensive in Gaza, and the 
negotiation of this definition. The word ‘potential’ is of crucial importance here, and 
demonstrates legal flexibility in an extreme form: an understanding of the ‘civilian’ so broad 
that it blurs the borderline between the categories of civilian and combatant, and entails, in 
effect, a rejection of the civilian category (Slim, 2003). As became evident in military actions 
carried out in Gaza, extensive flexibility assigned to the civilian category undermines its 
integral capacity and potential for protection of the right to life. 
And so, the case of the police line-up as well as more general debates regarding the 
classification of Gazan police forces as either combatants or civilians provides an illustration 
of the negotiation of these categories. Positions held by team members, the Goldstone Report, 
NGOs and analytical accounts all diverge and provide different perspectives on this matter. 
Of course, the final verdict was that of the aggressor, and in this the ILD team's view must be 
regarded as significant. The verdict of the aggressor, indeed, negotiated the civilian and 
combatant categories in a way which narrowed down the notion of ‘the civilian’ to an extent 
that almost eliminates this category altogether.  
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The principle of proportionality in practice 
The principle of proportionality, the weighing of military advantage against harm to civilians, 
is fundamental to IHL. An attack is illegal if its expected collateral damage to civilians is 
excessive in relation to predicted military gain. This section examines, through a case study, 
how proportion was measured and evaluated in the case of the Gaza offensive, and what was 
seen (not) to constitute "excessive collateral damage". 
Case study: The killing of Nizar Rayan and his family in view of the principle of 
proportionality  
On January 1 2009, the Israeli air forces bombed the house of Hamas senior Nizar Rayan in 
Jabalya refugee camp. The blast killed Rayan, four women (Rayan’s wives), and their eleven 
children, aged one to twelve years old. In an official statement, the military spokesperson 
said: "the house served as a large munitions warehouse and as a war room. Under the house 
was an escape tunnel for terrorist members of Hamas's military wing" (IDF, 2009). In a 
verbal statement, the army spokesperson said that the Rayan family had been warned of the 
coming attack, but despite this warning, family members did not leave their home. 
Following this incident, the Israeli NGO B’Tselem published a statement arguing that this 
case raises suspicion as to violation of the principle of proportionality (B’Tselem, 2010). The 
underlying assumptions of the NGO, discussed in its statement, were that while Nizar Rayan, 
a senior Hamas military official, was likely a legitimate target for attack, the family women 
and children were not. In the circumstances of the ongoing military campaign, the 
organisation stated, it is not clear how this attack was supposed to secure military advantage 
that was proportional to the loss of civilian lives.  
A newspaper article published after the attack (Blau and Feldman, 2009) revealed a rather 
unexpected legal position held by the ILD team in regard to this matter. An ILD team 
member was quoted as saying that in cases such as the case of Nizar Rayan, where warning 
of an intended attack had been given, people who chose not to leave the place of assault lost 
their civilian protection and became legitimate military targets. In this light, women and 
children of the Rayan family were not regarded as ‘collateral damage’, because they were no 
longer considered to be entitled to civilian protection. This legal interpretation is partially 
based on a ruling made by the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ, 2005), which in a decision 
regarding “targeted killing” distinguishes between “voluntary” human shields and those not 
voluntary. The former, the ruling asserts, are to be considered a legitimate military target; it is 
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not clear in this ruling, however, what constitutes this ‘voluntarism’, and how it should be 
identified.   
The legal shift from the issue of proportionality to that of the civilian category further 
demonstrates the elastic application of law. But we shall return to the discussion of 
proportion in order to understand how proportionality is perceived, calculated and decided by 
the ILD team. Team members’ accounts of proportionality reveal first, the subjective nature 
of the interpretation which it entails and with which it is applied and second, the uncertainties 
embedded in these decision-making situations: 
There is no legal answer to the question of what proportionality is. It’s not that I can say: this 
is proportional, this is not. You have to take into account considerations A, B, C and D, look 
at this and that, and then consider the whole question (Interview, 21.12.10) 
 There are many difficult decisions (…) when I can’t say if the decisions are proportional or 
not. I can ask questions: did you think of that? Do you have information about X? (…) do you 
know of sensitive objects that are near to the place of attack? (Interview, 20.2.11) 
 In planned operations we have mathematicians who calculate the hit radius of every bomb, 
and they give you a numeric estimation of the odds that the windows of the neighboring house 
will be shattered, and then the odds that this broken glass will hit the next room…with 
unbelievable details (…) and still - you don’t know. I mean, when they say that there’s an 
80% chance of serious injuries in the house next door, you still don’t know who is in the 
other house. The variables always have a lot of holes in them. And then you say, okay, based 
on the information we have right now, and we’ve done our best to gather information as we 
reasonably can, what do we know about danger to innocent people, and what is the expected 
military advantage? Now, let’s decide if this is worthwhile (Interview, 9.12.10)  
Considering the confidential nature of military decision making, the exact components and 
‘weight’ assigned to variables in calculations will probably never be fully known. But this 
exact calculation, evaluating known information and expected results, is the only way to 
decide whether or not this principle had been applied appropriately. For this reason, in 
practical terms it is almost impossible for actors external to state agencies to prove a violation 
of this legal code.  
But even beyond limitations of access to information, military considerations are formed 
within a specific frame and context, which can predetermine the results of these 
‘calculations’. Michael Walzer (1977) discusses the concept of military necessity in a way 
which illuminates the ‘holes’ in military discourse: 
In fact, it is not about necessity at all; it is a way of speaking in code, or a hyperbolical way 
of speaking, about probability and risk. Even if one grants the right of states and armies and 
individual soldiers to reduce their risks, a particular course of action will be necessary 
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[Emphasis in original] to that end only if no other course improved the odds of battle at all. 
But there will always be a range of tactical strategic options that conceivably could improve 
the odds (144)  
In this light, David Kennedy (2006) points out that the equation of “proportionality” or 
limitation of civilian death becomes, through an interpretive legal process, a pragmatic 
consideration: the legal limit is no more civilians than is ‘necessary’; but this calculation of 
‘proportion’ by definition relativizes civilians as compared to combatants, and in this negates 
the importance of the distinction between these two categories. In this view, IHL codes per-se 
offer a highly compromised protection of civilian lives. Kennedy provides an illuminating 
example for his argument when he applies the principle of proportion to the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This application reveals the inherent limitation of the law in 
question, in that it demonstrates its limitless nature, an ability to transform any act of war, 
regardless of magnitude or consequence, to a calculation of military advantage and collateral 
damage.  
Therefore, different opinions with regard to the case of the Rayan family and general 
discussions about the principle of proportionality reveal the weakness of this principle in 
safeguarding life, namely, they expose its inherent subjectivity and its unbounded nature. In 
the specific case of the Rayan family, as in any other instance, the confidential nature of 
military decision making renders close scrutiny of this ‘calculation’ almost impossible. 
Moreover, the arguments of Walzer and Kennedy on the discourse of legal principles shed 
light on the circularity of military logic. In this sense, an external perspective to that of 
military discourse reveals that ‘calculations’ defy translation to non-military language and 
perception, as it loses its logic of justification.  
 
Life in IHL and Human Rights Law 
“People don’t understand that dead civilians are not a breach of law” (Interview, 21.12.10) 
As accounts of law in theory and practice have demonstrated, the legal corpuses of IHL and 
human rights provide starkly different protections to people. While in the frame of human 
rights, the right to life is paramount, IHL allows for a negotiation of life. Reviews of the legal 
principles of distinction and proportion explored the nature of this negotiation and the 
inability to translate ‘calculations’ to language that is not that of military discourse. The result 
of this negotiation was, in the case of Gaza, extensive violations of the right to life. 
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An important question in this regard concerns the application of the human rights legal 
system. It is commonly argued that human rights are inapplicable in times of war (Provost, 
2002), although there is opposition to this opinion (Scobbie, 2010). Unsurprisingly, the 
official Israeli stand in regard to Gaza does not accept human rights as an applicable legal 
system.  
But a crucial question is, then, what constitutes war. As David Kennedy (2006) convincingly 
argues and demonstrates with reference to the “War on Terror”, within the contemporary 
global political system, the distinction between war and peace tends to be a matter of extent 
or emphasis. An exclusion from the human rights system is highly problematic, both on 
theoretical levels (who are excluded from these protections? Who is, then, the ‘human’ 
entitled to rights?), and most certainly in practical terms, because of the limited protection 
provided by the alternative IHL frame.  
 
The implications of law on war-making: the interplay of open-ended interpretation and 
legitimacy 
Much of international law is not about giving the correct legal advice; it’s about having good 
arguments. In most cases, there is no one result. You cannot be in the position of not having 
arguments, that’s the point. (Interview, 21.12.10) 
Grounded in legal codes that have become broadened and somewhat blurred, team members 
formulate advice and arguments. In this context, a “good argument” may result in initial 
approval or retroactive justification of extensive violations of the right to life. It is extremely 
important to consider the broader consequences of legal system and “good arguments” for the 
realities of war and law. Pictet (1985) defends IHL by arguing that it is needed as long as war 
is possible, because it provides people with some measure of protection. While it is not 
possible to determine whether and how war would have been different if law had not existed, 
it is certain that this law cannot be argued to simply safeguard people's lives. More precisely, 
while law offers some protection of lives, it also plays a part in the design of violence, and 
the manner in which violence is inflicted and perceived. In this light, law creates a structural 
paradox, as by setting prohibitions it implicitly authorizes everything which is excluded from 
its prohibitions (Weizman, 2009). This topic will be further addressed in the next chapter, in 





This chapter considered the application of IHL principles of distinction and proportionality 
by the ILD team, based on case studies of military actions carried out during the offensive in 
Gaza, in which the right to life was violated. Legal interpretation was placed in an analytical 
context, focused on the definition of the ‘civilian’ category and the calculation of ‘proportion’ 
as part of military legal discourse. As the critiques made by Michael Walzer and David 
Kennedy stress, the discourse of law is contradictory and circular. In this sense, “necessity”, 
has little to do with what is necessary, and “proportionality”, which relies on the core 
distinction between civilians and combatants, in essence negates the importance of this same 
division. In this context I hope to have shown that Pictet’s defence of IHL as a shield for 
civilian lives does not account for all the implications of this law in times of war. As this 
thesis claims, in Israel's Gaza offensive, many people lost their lives while they were in their 
homes, at their place of work or in the street, simply because they 'slipped' over to the wrong 
side of a contradictory and blurry interpretation of International Law produced at the not-so-






Chapter 2: The International Law Department as an organisation  
 
This chapter describes and analyzes the work of the ILD team in light of perspectives and 
tools derived from organisation theory. Within this theoretical field, the focus of this paper 
lies in interpretive approaches that look to the views and understandings of individuals in 
order to construct an analysis of a larger organisation in which these individuals participate. 
Following this theory, the chapter will draw on team members’ perceptions of their role and 
position within the military system in an attempt to better comprehend the decision-making 
processes that shape legal advice and military conduct. I will connect these insights to 
conclusions regarding law which resulted from the discussion of the previous chapter in order 
to formulate a broader analysis of wartime law as it operates within an organisational context.  
As stated previously, the field of organisation theory is diverse (Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2005) 
and offers many different theoretical approaches (Edward Rubin 2005). This paper will show 
that the ILD team's legal work requires an analysis grounded in a broad contextual social 
frame, as well as an understanding of the complex dynamics between structure and 
individual. In order to understand and evaluate the ways in which social, political and cultural 
contexts shape organisational dynamics, this paper turns to interpretive approaches derived 
from organisation theory. These approaches examine the ways in which groups and 
individuals within them develop and communicate meaning (Hatch and Yanow, 2005). In 
considering legal interpretation, ‘the world’ of broader contextual frameworks enters the 
analysis since interpretation, by definition, is based on context.   
ILD team members’ perceptions of their work and position 
Interpretive theory understands an organisation as grounded in a network of objects such as 
policies, job descriptions and procedures. Analytical emphasis is placed on the ways in which 
these objects are understood and utilized (Morgan, 1997); thus, for example, different written 
procedures which are formally equal will be evaluated on the basis of weight and importance 
assigned to them in practice by employees. In the case of the ILD team, the central objects 
are military goals and procedures, international law conventions, past court rulings, and so 
forth. All these provide primary points of reference for members in their own understanding 
of the nature of their work.  
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Based on interpretive theory, then, a main question is just how these objects are understood 
and weighed by team members. During interviews, members described tension between law 
and military goals. A common situation described in this context was an instance when a 
commanding officer requests legal opinion and then pressures team members to provide the 
advice that is most suited to military goals: 
Commanding officers get upset sometimes [with legal advisors, M.G.], certainly this is the 
case in stressful situations, when they say ‘let us win’. These are issues that are inherent to 
this kind of interaction. […] the closer you get [to the battlefield, M.G.], the greater the 
pressure gets. (Interview, 20.12.10) 
Another legal advisor described similar difficulties related to an additional factor, military 
rank. Rank further complicates the tension between military regulations and law by adding 
the ‘object’ of hierarchical organisational structure to the picture:  
There is a problem, because lawyers are commonly of lower rank [as compared to the 
commanding officer, M.G.], and then, in a hierarchical army, a lot depends on the 
commanding officer… in many cases, officers regard military rank as an indication of the 
importance of what is being said, but that depends on the officer. (Interview, 9.12.10)    
 
Perceptions of roles: independence vs. pressure 
Moving beyond ‘objects’ to team members’ broader perceptions of their role and position, 
Karl Weick (1995) suggests to examine the way that individuals make-sense and construct 
the meaning of their work. As Weick explains, while people construct meaning to any social 
interaction, the process of sense-making within an organisation is unique in that: a. an 
organisation facilitates joint action, hence influences thought and work both in visible ways 
and with its “invisible hand” and b. it invokes relatively many occasions in which members 
of the organisation question and criticize work, procedures and so on.  
This description of "tension" with the military hierarchy offers a critical reflection on team 
members' position within the system. But ILD team members also gave meaning to their role 
by discussing their independent status in formulating legal advice, a description that 
contradicts, in spirit, their account of tension with the system. One team member said “The 
military legal system is independent. (…) No commanding officer can give orders to an 
officer who is a member of the MAG” (Interview, 20.12.10), and another: “The ILD team are 
a completely independent body, and that is a powerful thing (…) you even slightly intimidate 
the system as an independent body” (Interview, 9.12.10). 
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A semiotic feature which repeated in interviews is that legal advisors tended to use language 
which distanced themselves from the military. Some referred to the army in the third tense 
while using the word “us” to refer to the team. In this, advisors discursively positioned 
themselves as external to the military.  
This double positioning reflected in language is not a matter of random choice of words. 
Indeed, team members are aware of their dual position of composing legal advice while 
serving in the military: 
You wear a uniform, and you’re a part of ‘us’, and if you would get some external lawyer into 
that field, lack of trust and hostility may be very substantial. The only reason why they can sit 
beside commanding officers and be listened to, and have their say taken into account, is 
because they are a part of the system. (Interview, 9.12.10)  
The legal advisor has a double loyalty, and he will be treated with suspicion. There is no way 
around that (Interview, 21.12.10) 
ILD Team interviewees made-sense of their work and position in an incoherent manner 
implying a level of ambivalence, as was reflected in their discussion of independence 
alongside tension and pressure, as well as in their discursive distinction between ‘us’ and 
‘them’. As I stated previously, within the military organisational structure, the legal system is 
formally separated from operational branches. For this reason, team members are not 
hierarchically subjected to the command of non-legal officers. This is the basis for the 
us/them distinction that officers repeatedly displayed in interviews. However, as advisors 
testified, their independence does not translate to freedom in drafting legal advice.  
Recalling Weick’s conceptualisation of sense-making in an organisation, the team members' 
conceptualization of their role has been shown to include an element of criticism towards 
their organisational structure. As I will attempt to examine the role of legal advice in the 
violation of the right to life, it is important to note the implication of the described dual 
affiliation to the formation of legal advice. In this context, I asked a team member whether 
military legal advisors formulate advice which other, civilian legal experts would not have 
endorsed. The team member replied:  
Most certainly. I took part in the operation [Cast Lead, M.G.], I had to walk down unpleasant 
paths […] so that I could build a balance, and so that the commanding officer will 
understand that I am not copping out of trying understand his limitations […] some 
commanding officers don’t understand our work well enough, so they’re afraid to ask the 
legal advisor questions, because they think he would say no [to military actions, M.G.] 
(Interview, 21.12.10)  
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This account of legal work that attempts to refrain from refusing the demands of commanding 
officers is similar to perspectives which appeared in Dickinson’s (2010) research on the US 
military legal team:  
As one judge advocate put it, “You can’t be Dr. No” (…) another judge advocate put it thus: 
“[I] wanted to help my commander get to yes.” Similarly, a third reported that his job was 
“finding a way to yes . . . . Your first response shouldn’t be no.” Instead, “you should think, 
‘How can I help my commander accomplish the objective? (20) 
 
The team member's account of the need to ‘understand’ commanding officers, to walk down 
unpleasant paths and find a ‘yes’, is analytically important in two ways: first, it reveals an 
awareness of the limits of legal interpretation within the military organisation, and second, it 
emphasizes the complex dynamics between the organisational structure and the individual. 
 
The dynamics between military structure and individuals, ILD team members 
In examining the organisational dynamics which encompass legal advisors’ work, it is 
pertinent to realise the nuances of the process through which advice is formulated. 
Interviewees described their legal work as grounded in the military system. Only a legal 
account which understands this system from within, they argued, will be taken seriously. But 
this is a circular mode of decision making: in order for legal advice to be “taken seriously”, 
legal interpretation is constructed and formulated in a way which would be acceptable to 
commanders and military goals. Legal decision making which takes into account the assumed 
expectation and future reaction of officers seems, on one hand, like a common-sense and 
obvious policy. But on the other hand, the considerations that legal advisors adopt in their 
decision making portray a complex interplay of ‘agency’, the individual, and structure.   
In further considering the relations between agency and structure, organisation theory takes 
discussion forward by critically examining the boundaries between these concepts. Most 
crucially, organisation theory asks whether one dominates the other, and if these concepts are 
at all separable from one another. As Michael Reed (2005) rightly argues, this matter is 
pertinent because definitions of this structure/agency dynamic carry broad assumptions as to 
humanity, society and consequently to notions of identity, freedom of thought and 
responsibility. Theories differ in their emphasis of either the agency or structure, as well as in 




Thus, we might begin to unravel the dynamics of the organisation and individuals’ 
perceptions. Reflecting on the issue of independent thought within an organisation, David 
Held (1980) argues that by establishing the definitions for ‘good work’ and ‘good worker’ the 
organisation shapes the construction of meaning in both visible and invisible ways. Gareth 
Morgan (1997) suggests the “psychic prison” as metaphor aimed to demonstrate 
organisational construction of meaning which occurs beyond surface level influence. This 
metaphor illustrates the way in which position affects thought; from a certain organisational 
perspective, false perceptions are regarded and maintained as truth and fact. Both Held and 
Morgan, develop theory which explains how the organisation suppresses alternative 
understandings and critical thinking. Approaches such as theirs emphasize structure and 
lessen the significance of the agency.   
As military officers, legal advisors are part of the military system, and presumably support its 
goals and logic. It would be impossible to measure the extent of identification legal advisors 
maintain with this system in relation to the system's extensive violations of the right to life. In 
interviews, questions on the consequences of military violence were, unsurprisingly, left 
unanswered. However, it is important to note the manner in which team members 
contradicted Held and Morgan’s positions by demonstrating that employees do tend to be 
reflexive in regard to their position and work. Thus, it cannot be argued that the ‘agency’ is 
passive or an insignificant factor within these dynamics. The fact that a workplace such as the 
military implies identifications related to nationalism and national identity, undoubtedly 
influences this tendency, but does not account for it fully. 
An interesting addition to the discussion of agency and structure lies in the fact that advisors 
consider themselves to be agents of change in the military system. As accounts of team 
members demonstrate, they do not see themselves as mere interpreters of law; rather, they 
view their work as contributing to the creation of law:  
The way in which international law evolves (…) is the way of practice. This means that the 
activities of states, the ways in which they act, including the ways in which they explain what 
they do, creates law. (…) When states are confronted with new kinds of threats (…) like 
terrorist organisations, in combat, they act and employ principles and rules with adaptations 
that are required by the new situations. Through these adaptations, they are, in fact, creating 
new law. (Pnina Sharvit-Baruch in the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Conference, 2009) 
…If you’re right, law shifts to your direction. Now, it takes time and practice, but when you 
understand that this is the way that international law works, you understand how hard it is to 
say ‘illegal’ and ‘legal’ in grey zones. (Interview, 9.12.10)  
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In further reflecting on the agency/structure dilemma, Reed (1995) suggests a mid-way 
approach to these dynamics, and titles his approach relational. He defines agency and 
structure in relation to one another. Both concepts are meaningful in analysis and practice; 
they are interrelated yet separable and constitute interplay of social action and structural 
constraint. Interview findings affirm Reed’s analysis: advisors’ description of their work 
account both for entanglement and separateness between themselves and their encompassing 
structure. Team members’ reflexive views on their own position and work, as well as their 
perception of their own legal interpretation as law-making, are both evident of an extent of 
separateness. However, the detailed account of the decision making process revealed 
relations wherein the organisational structure plays a crucial part in shaping individuals’ 
thoughts and decisions.   
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter discussed the military ILD team by employing the tools of organisation theory. 
Theoretical tools and interpretive approaches were employed to analyse perceptions of team 
members. Based on interviewees' accounts, the paper conceptualised a wide view of advisors’ 
roles. I found that team members make sense of their role in an incoherent manner: on one 
hand, they describe their independent status as legal advisors, and on the other, they accept 
and acknowledge the pressure placed on them to adapt advice to combat goals. Based on 
these insights, the chapter then debated the dynamics between individuals and structure in 
this case. Noting the complex and perhaps muddled perceptions team members have of their 
own positions, I concluded that agency/structure dynamics in this case are relational. Both the 
structure, the military, and agency, team members, are significant factors analytically and 
practically, concurrently interrelated yet separable. This chapter therefore added an important 
dimension to the understanding of legal decision-making processes in the military, as an 
ambivalently oriented process. It expanded the debate on International Law by examining its 




Chapter 3: Responsibility: the interrelations of morality, law and the 
organisation in the case of the International Law Department  
 
This research has shown that IHL codes, both in theoretical terms and as applied by the ILD 
team, provide limited protection for the right to life. It has further asserted that organisational 
dynamics negotiate the borderline between individual and structure, and that this process 
results in compromised legal interpretation. The limited protection of the right to life offered 
by legal codes, on the one hand, and advisors’ compromising legal interpretation on the other, 
raise difficult questions vis-a-vis responsibility.  
This chapter will re-approach legal and organisational aspects in the work of the ILD team, 
equipped with the frame of responsibility. For the purpose of this paper, responsibility is 
defined simply as the flip-side of power. In this sense, responsibility exists to the extent that 
power does. It is understood here as a compound construct, encompassing both structural 
(legal, organisational) and subjective-individual (moral, emotional) aspects. As part of this 
discussion, the paper will introduce the concept of morality, in relation to law and the 
organisation.  
Main inquiries guiding this debate consider the meaning and significance of the term 
"morality" in the context of law, war and responsibility, and whether it can fill the existing 
gap in the legal safeguards of the right to life, as has been suggested by several theoretical 
contributors to this field. Other issues central to this discussion are the complex inter-
relations between law and morality, and the implications of these dynamics to the notion of 
responsibility in an organisational context.  
 
Law and morality 
In legal theory, the traditions of naturalism and positivism have different assumptions as to 
the relations between law and morality. The naturalist school assumes that the origins of law 
are ultimately outside of the will of mankind, whether they lie in ‘nature’, ‘divine law’ or 
morality (Feinberg and Coleman, 2003). Positivism, however, assumes human discretion as 
the source of legal systems. In this sense, there is no inherent connection between these 
concepts. In contemporary legal theory and practice, however, it is common that legal 
argumentation relies on a combination of these two schools of thought (Rubin, 1997). This 
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dissertation does not seek to determine which of these schools is correct; rather, by relying on 
the perceptions of practitioners, it will examine how these perceptions affect legal work in 
this specific case. The paper does not provide a single definition for morality, and this is 
because it aims to scrutinize this concept as it is understood by practitioners, in comparison to 
theoretical debates of the term.  
By examining debates regarding naturalism and positivism as they relate to practice, I seek to 
discover whether legal advisors assume that law and morality are separate, as accords with 
positivist assumptions, or whether they see an inherent connection between these terms, in a 
manner that affirms a naturalist conception of law. In other words, I wish to enquire whether 
or not advisors consider it their job and responsibility to practice morality in wartime, and 
how the answer to this question affects legal decision making. 
ILD Team members expressed diverse opinions both regarding the relation between law and 
morality, and the consequent implications of this relation to their job and area of 
responsibility:  
We are not responsible for morality. Morality is not relevant for the work of this team. (…) 
The question of whether or not the IDF is a moral military is of no concern to us. (Interview, 
20.12.10) 
 
We are experts in law. Everyone has moral judgment: commanders, soldiers, citizens and 
also us […] but of course, law itself is based on moral principles (Interview, 20.2.11) 
  
In morality, as opposed to law, we have no monopoly […] but the legal expert, because of his 
position in the system…will be the one to raise the moral aspect…he makes sure that this 
issue is not forgotten, due to all the enthusiasm of achieving the goal (Interview, 21.12.10)    
 
While the first informant draws a clear separation between morality and law, the others 
expressed less definite opinions on this matter, which could be theoretically positioned as a 
mid-way between naturalist and positivist traditions.  
The interrelations between morality and law, however, are not limited to the debate of 
origins. It is extremely important to consider in this context that law has normative and 
legitimizing power. With this in mind, it cannot be argued that law has nothing to do with 
morality, because in determining the border between the legal and illegal, law also constitutes 
right and wrong and by implication contributes to the social and cultural definitions of justice 
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and morality. Moreover, in determining these borders, law positions itself unreachable to 
scrutiny. David Kennedy (2006) convincingly presents this argument: 
We no longer need to decide for ourselves whether law is civilized, whether killing this 
civilian is a good idea, whether attacking this town is ethically defensible. The law of armed 
conflict will do that for us (141) 
Kennedy also provides a more field-related example for the crucial impact of legal codes on 
notions of right and just, and subsequently, on psycho-social norms: 
 I was struck that Iraq war reporting was filled with anecdotes about soldiers overcome by 
remorse at having slaughtered civilians- and being counselled back to duty by their officers, 
their chaplains, their mental health professionals, who explained that what they had done 
was necessary, proportional, and therefore just (146) 
The account of the normative power of law adds a layer of meaning to legal advisors’ views 
on the relations between morality and law, further strengthening the importance of the notion 
of responsibility in this debate. In terms of the views of legal advisors, perceptions of the 
relations of law and morality which are overly direct adoptions of either the naturalist or the 
positivist positions are most precarious. On one hand, a legal advisor that does not consider 
morality a part of his job is a cause for concern because law, de-facto, contributes to the 
constitution of ‘justice’. On the other hand, the very idea of an official advisor "in charge" of 
morality seems either absurd or suggestive of a system which structurally lacks morality. In 
spite of this undeniable absurdity, it is equally impossible to deny that an emphasis on the 
link between morality and law may lead to such a perception of the role of advisors. 
Recalling the third quoted source, who said “the legal expert, because of his position in the 
system (…) will be the one to raise the moral aspect” provides an account that demonstrates 
this problem; although the source did explicitly state that he does not, as a lawyer, consider 
himself to be the sole bearer of responsibility for morality, he described his position in the 
system as one that makes him the agent responsible for morality.  
Thus, as my discussion has pointed out, definitions of the morality-law relation which are 
closer to either extreme of the naturalist or positivist schools are highly problematic in 
translation to military legal work. Assumedly, different stands of legal advisors towards the 
relevance of morality to their work result in their assumption of varied degrees and forms of 
responsibility. But these perceptions are, as this paper showed, not the only component in 
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position of advisors vis-a-vis morality, and hence also, responsibility. The normative power 
of law implies that, Regardless of their own narrative, advisors bear moral responsibility in 
the sense that they have power in the process of shaping military moral agenda.  
 
“Morality” in war 
As Michael Walzer (1977) argues, the nature of morality as it applies to war is a compendium 
of diverse writing and activity:         
…the moral reality of war is not fixed by the actual activities of soldiers, but by the opinions 
of mankind. That means, in part, that it is fixed by the activity of philosophers, lawyers, 
publicists of all sorts (15) 
The paper will review several theoretical approaches to this issue prior to discussing the 
concept as it is addressed by the ILD team members.  
Norman (1995) focuses his ethical account of war in killing, and is hence particularly 
relevant to this discussion on the right to life. Norman’s critique relies on a fundamental 
claim regarding the irreconcilable tension between every-day understandings of moral codes 
and those applied in war. In this, he questions the ethical reliance on the context of war as 
justification for killing. The weakness of his argument is its irrelevance to the contemporary 
realities of war, as demonstrated for instance by the actions of the Israeli military in Gaza. 
Martin Shaw (2005) demonstrates the limited relevance of Norman’s perspective to the 
practice of war in his ‘Risk-Transfer’ analysis. Through this model Shaw points out that in 
contemporary wars involving Western powers, not only is killing acceptable, but the pattern 
of combat goes further and violates the principle of prioritizing the lives of those not involved 
in combat. In the case of the offensive in Gaza, massive use of artillery within the densely 
populated strip, a military option that was known to cause extensive loss of civilian lives, 
provides an example for a pattern of warfare which de facto prioritizes the lives of state 
soldiers over those of the ‘enemy’, both combatants and civilians (Levy, 2010). Shaw 
concludes his analysis by arguing that it would be very difficult to morally defend Risk-
Transfer war.  
In the Israeli context, Amos Yadlin and Asa Kasher (2005) formulated a document which 
they refer to as an alternative, more ethical IHL doctrine, adapted to the need to deal with 
terrorism and "a-symmetrical" warfare. This document approaches the prioritization of state 
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combatants over ‘enemy’ civilians, the same position which Shaw regarded as a moral 
failure. But in Yadlin and Kasher’s doctrine, morality is employed to serve the counter 
argument; lives of the state’s soldiers have a moral priority to those of enemy civilians, and 
this is justified in the context of the immoral nature of terror.      
Interestingly, the prioritization of soldiers in Yadlin and Kasher’s doctrine is phrased in a 
way which ironically follows Norman’s argument in attempting to apply every-day standards 
of morality to war, hence making killing of a certain kind unacceptable: “A combatant is a 
citizen in uniform (…) His blood is as red and thick as that of citizens who are not in 
uniform” (16).  The two writers departed from the legal codes of war and turned Israeli 
soldiers into citizens. Unfortunately, then, this argument provides only a selective protection 
for the right to life, and in this justifies severe consequences for the adversary in a war. 
Notably, the writers link this re-prioritization to responsibility, that of a state to its citizens. In 
this, then, the writers do not renounce responsibility; rather choose to apply it selectively: 
“The state ought to have a compelling reason for jeopardizing a citizen’s life, whether or not 
he or she is in uniform” (16).   
Gabriella Blum (2010) further discusses tension between morality and IHL and argues 
against the absolute application of IHL. A ‘lesser-evil’ solution to some war-related 
dilemmas, Blum suggests, lies in violation of this law. And so, morality here is prioritized 
over law, in a manner which relies on interpretations of what constitutes morality and what 
evil. Blum’s position entrusts what seems to be exaggerated faith in the moral judgment or 
responsibility of parties to war (Diamond, 2010). Indeed, as critical examination reveals, such 
judgment inevitably tends to be highly subjective and dependant on ideologies and interests 
of conflicting parties. 
The accounts of the ILD team express positions that consider military actions, including those 
that involve killing, as morally just, and view the mere employment of certain tools provided 
by IHL to be a moral achievement (a position which also shows an unclear conceptual 
distinction between law and morality): 
It must be understood that the fact that people uninvolved [in combat, M.G.] are hurt does 
not mean that the action was illegal or even immoral (Pnina Sharvit-Baruch in Al-Peleg and 
Sarusi, 2009) 
…it’s very important that he [the soldier, M.G.] knows that he is representing something 
admirable, worth fighting for…this is why the moral-legal issue is so important…if the army 
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degrades to the level of terrorists or criminals…then we’re through…the army will dissemble 
(Interview, 21.12.10) 
While the second source stresses the contribution of morality to the organisational culture and 
sense of identity among military personnel, the first quote defines the concept of morality as 
allowing for injury and death of civilians uninvolved in combat. Considered in relation to one 
another, the quotes capture a complex yet convincing process of sense-making that allows for 
violation of the right to life, without compromising moral identity and a sense of honour and 
pride, on personal and collective levels. The next section will further examine this 
"production" of morality as a process built into the military system. 
 
The IDF ethical code 
The IDF Spirit (titled ha'kod ha'eti in Hebrew, or the ethical code), formulated by Asa 
Kasher, includes a set of values aimed to define and shape military attitude and identity. 
Among the values endorsed by this document are love of the homeland and discipline, as well 
as respect for human life and ‘purity of arms’, the appropriate use of weapon. Anat Matar 
(2006) argues that this document creates a set of norms that are so general and abstract as to 
be hollow, and in this sense, the document, in fact, creates no standards at all. The code and 
the criticism it has provoked provide further proof for the subjective, easily redefined nature 
of ‘ethics’ in war. The code also shows that the function of such documents is also in defining 
personal and collective identity in terms that seem to value human life, without providing any 
guidance as to its actual protection. Interestingly, ILD Team sources said that commanders 
consider this ethical code to be inherent to the military, as opposed to IHL, which is 
perceived as imposed from the outside. This positioning of law on the outside is parallel to 
the ILD team's own narrative of their status as outside of the military structure, a position 
which, as my project argued, leads to compromised legal interpretation. Regrettably, the 
"internalization" of the ethical code, also provides limited protections to the right to life of the 
‘enemy’, as was evident in the case of Gaza.  
Drawing on theoretical debates and findings of this research, it is evident that morality is a 
concept charged with varied meanings, perceived subjectively and employed in ways which 
serve both to strengthen and challenge law and the protection of lives. Norman’s approach, in 
its indiscriminate prioritization of life, provides a clear cut account for morality- it cannot be 
reconciled with killing. Although this approach may be appealing in the search for protection 
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for lives, its understanding of morality as a concept of fixed meaning puts it at unfortunate 
distance from the realities of war and cannot be satisfactory in this debate. 
 
Responsibility and legal work in the military  
An inquiry into the nature of the responsibility of legal advisors must begin by recalling their 
official, structural position, namely, that of advisors rather than decision-makers. As such, 
team members generally do not bear any operational responsibility for military actions. This 
separation of military legal work from decision making and responsibility was supported by a 
government-appointed committee, which examined these matters in general terms 
(Winograd, 2008). The report produced by this committee recommended the involvement of 
legal advisors in preliminary and aftermath debates concerning military actions, but also 
endorsed their exclusion from real-time decision making. By adopting such a policy, the 
report explains, there will be no shifting of responsibility from commanding officers to 
advisors. The ILD team does provide real-time legal advice, but as the paper had shown, it 
does follow the normative, conceptual distinction of law and decision making which the 
report recommends.   
Of course, a discussion of team members’ responsibility lies beyond the official military 
structure and its division of roles. Although, as advisors, team members do not officially hold 
responsibility for decisions made and consequent military actions, their position as an 
authority in matters of law indeed entails inherent responsibility. This is due to a combination 
of factors, as the paper asserted in regard to morality: the legitimizing power embedded in 
law and the assumption of a moral role by the advisors themselves. The ILD team's position 
vis–a-vis responsibility is therefore ambiguous: they are officially excluded from 
responsibility, but the normative role of law makes their actual level of responsibility elusive. 
Furthermore, legal advice is formulated apart from responsibility, but the military officials 
who follow this advice rely on it to bestow legitimacy on decision making (due to the 
equation of legal and just). Thus, law appears to act independently, and the concept of 
responsibility loses its content (Kennedy, 2006).    
Reed’s account of a relational approach to structure and agency further complicates the 
discussion on responsibility. In application of Reed's relational approach to the ILD team, as 
this paper asserted, team members are not entirely separable from their encompassing 
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structure, the military. But these dynamics also complicate an account of responsibility, 
because if individual and structure are not entirely separable, it is unclear where 
responsibility lies in cases of wrongdoing. Moreover, given the subjective nature of moral 
judgement, it is unclear where responsibility lies concerning the identification of what 
constitutes wrongdoing. 
Moreover, in law responsibility is directly linked to a violation of legal codes. But referring 
back to case studies debated in the first chapter of this dissertation, the bombing of police 
line-up and the Rayan family, these illustrate the inherent and structural difficulty of 
determining whether or not law had been violated. As the paper showed, this difficulty is not 
unique to these cases, because it is a result of: broadness of legal codes, and even more 
crucially, legal discursive realm, which lends legitimacy to killing, in accordance its internal 
‘logic’. This state of affairs in effect undermines the very notion of responsibility, by 
sustaining obstacles to its determination, while still assuming the loss of life. 
In this context, even when wrongdoing is acknowledged, the position of attorneys in an 
organisation may raise questions as to the ‘location’ of responsibility. Debates regarding the 
responsibilities of state attorneys arose in the US following the exposure of the documents 
which became known as the “torture memos”, in which state lawyers authorized torture of 
prisoners (Sands, 2008; Bilder and Vagts, 2004). In this context, Kathleen Clark (2005) 
suggests a distinction between legal work as advocacy, and legal work in an advising 
capacity. In advocacy, Clark argues, a lawyer seeks to adjust law to concrete situations by an 
act of interpretation, in order to build the best possible ‘case’ for a client's interest. If we 
apply this distinction to the work of the ILD team, the efforts of advisors to interpret law in a 
way which facilitates the desires of a ‘client’, in this case, a commanding officer is 
illuminated. Clark argues that, differently, when legal advisors are to formulate opinion 
which will shape military actions, they are responsible for providing reasonable legal 
interpretation, which doesn't necessarily fit the ‘client’s’ wishes.  
While Clark’s suggestions are useful guidelines they, of course, cannot provide a clear 
definition as to what constitutes ‘reasonable’. Moreover, if applied to the ILD team, in view 
of relational dynamics of agency and structure, including the intertwined aspect of these 
concepts, it may be difficult to draw the line between client and attorney, separation which 
would allow the distinction between an occasion of advocacy and that of advice-seeking.   
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However, it is important to recall that in this relational account of dynamics, both individual 
and structure are analytically significant concepts, and separable to a certain extent. In the 
case of team members, some aspects of advisory legal work attest to a degree of individual, 
independent thought and action. With this in mind, a certain extent of agency, hence 
responsibility is retained. This partial and fragmented assignment of responsibility strikes as 
insufficient when considering cases involving extensive violations of the right to life, but it is 
nevertheless a starting point.   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter used the frame of responsibility to debate issues of law, morality and the 
organisation regarding the ILD team. These different relations were examined both in 
theoretical terms, and as these are practiced in the work of the team. My account has asserted 
that all these junctions pose obstacles in the search for responsibility. Firstly, the character of 
IHL codes leads to difficulties in determining whether or not a violation of law had taken 
place in the first place, even if many lives had been lost. Morality is a term used in different 
ways and contexts regarding war, some of these, as advisors demonstrated, justify the 
violation of the right to life. Moreover, the relation of this concept to law is contested, a 
situation which, in an organisational context, contributes to the elusive nature of 
responsibility—as law de-facto does impact the perception, hence the content, of “morality”. 
The organisational structure even further complicates questions of responsibility, in that the 
relations of structure and agency pose difficulty in tracing the flow of power in decision 
making, therefore deeming the assignment of responsibility even more complex. This elusive 
responsibility, which cannot be found in law, the organisation or in a moral account, is 
precisely the frame which enables individuals to take part in extensive violations of the right 









Absolute rules lead us to imagine we know what violence is just, what unjust, always and for 
everyone. But justice is not like that- it must be imagined, built by people, struggled for, 
redefined (Kennedy, 2006:104)    
In the course of the 2008/2009 offensive in Gaza, a man went out of his home to pray in the 
village mosque, and as he left the mosque he learned that his home had been bombed, all his 
family members buried in the ruins. In a different location, nine other family members were 
killed in the front yard of their home in a military attack aimed at a nearby target. At this time 
I was working for B’Tselem- the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories. As part of my work I was receiving testimonies of horrid occurrences 
such as these. More and more stories of death and destruction were brought to my desk, as to 
the desks of my colleagues.  
These accounts were unbearable, and I could not separate my reactions and feelings from the 
fact that as an Israeli citizen, this offensive was carried out in my name. Moreover, the 
offensive was backed with almost undisturbed public support. True, there were severe 
governmental restrictions on media coverage of what was happening in the strip, but even 
stories that were publicized did not change the overall public atmosphere. With this in mind, 
some of the questions which haunted me were: how was this made possible? How do 
individuals take part in the execution of such extreme violence, causing so many deaths of 
innocent people? Questions on the possibility of such violence could be asked in regard to 
any soldier or combatant. My own engagement in IHL and human rights, however, positioned 
my attention on military lawyers, those with whom I share a legal tool box. The questions I 
raised can be researched and analyzed from many different perspectives, among these varied 
psychological and sociological approaches. My theoretical basis, which was developed in the 
course of research and in correspondence with findings, was comprised of critical legal 
theory, organization theory and research regarding morality in war.  
The first chapter of this thesis analyzed IHL: the character of this legal discourse, its 
possibilities and inherent limitations in protecting the right to life. This account explored law 
both in theory and in relation to its application by the ILD team. I had concluded that in the 
realm of this discourse, terms such as ‘proportion’ or ‘civilian’ constitute meaning which in 
translation to other language, lose grasp with their corresponding phrase. Legal work of the 
ILD further expanded and negotiated these legal principles. In this context, IHL, rather than 
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simply limiting the use of force and protecting lives, in fact designs and shapes the 
conceptual framework and the concrete acts of violence.  
The second chapter added a layer of analysis as it researched and investigated team members’ 
perceptions of their position in the organization, as both lawyers and soldiers, parallel to the 
discussion on the relation of law to war. Accounts of advisors revealed an incoherent picture 
of independence on the one hand, and collaboration with overall military agenda on the other. 
Moreover, further enquiry on the position of advisors in the military system showed that the 
nature of dynamics between individuals and structure blurs the borderline between these two 
concepts. In this, while both entities are significant and influential, they concurrently separate 
and intertwined. As the paper showed, these organizational dynamics lead to compromised 
legal work, which negotiates and stretches legal principles which by-definition allow for 
extensive violation of the right to life.  
The thesis, in its third chapter, re-visited legal and organizational aspects in the work of the 
ILD team, equipped with the frame of responsibility. As part of this discussion, the paper 
debated the additional concept of “morality”, and explored the meaning of this term in war 
and law. “Morality” was found to serve different agendas; some of these justify the violation 
of the right to life. Moreover, the relation of this concept to law is contested, a situation 
which, in an organizational context, contributes to the elusive nature of responsibility. 
Additionally, the vague borderline between structure and agency further complicates the 
attempt to assign responsibility regarding lost lives. Lastly, in legal terms, the frame of law 
legitimizes, hence contributes to the acceptance of violence, but renders account of 
wrongdoing and responsibility ambiguous and elusive.    
And so, in light of these findings the paper concludes that the ILD team demonstrates how 
IHL, organisational structures of the military and perceptions of morality all play a role in 
enabling the execution of extreme violence and extensive violation of the right to life. 
Moreover, these same structures and conditions hinder the possibility of assigning 
responsibility for lives lost. 
In a final account, my own analysis of IHL did not attempt to disqualify this frame, as it 
remains an acceptable and valuable tool for the defence of human rights at times of war. My 
account, however, in addressing the right to life, chose to critically review this law, rather 
than assuming its codes as definite borders of what is ‘right’ in war. Existing frames are 
clearly and beyond any doubt insufficient in protection the right to life, and there is an urgent 
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need to develop of new and effective tools for this purpose. Referring to Kennedy’s words, 
indeed, legal tools and frames shape and limit thought, but the struggle for justice must not be 







This research has considered the actual practice of International Law in contemporary 
warfare, with the aspiration to contribute to its enforcement and to the respect of human 
rights in times of war. Based on the findings of the research, the following recommendations 
can be made: 
 
Research: 
1. Research of International Law mechanisms integrated in, or otherwise related to, 
military institutions of states other than Israel: case studies from countries other than 
Israel can contribute to the identification of obstacles to the protection of human 
rights that are particular to national context, and those that are universal and/or 
inherent to the limitations of International Law itself. It can hence assist law 
practitioners, nation-states, international and intra-national institutions in both 
designing legal principles and guidelines, and determining standards for responsibility 
and accountability in cases of human rights violations in warfare. 
2. Research on the location of responsibility in particular study-cases of human rights 
violations in warfare: Due to the elusive nature of responsibility in cases of human 
rights violations in contemporary warfare, as discussed in this paper, further academic 
and theoretical discussion is required to produce knowledge on the location of 
responsibility. Micro-level examination of human rights violations can lay the 
foundations for in-depth discussion on various possibilities to locate responsibility. It 
can then be translated to specific legal norms and guidelines, ensuring that 
organisational structures and institutions do not allow for responsibility for human 
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Appendix: Interview Guide  
 
1. Interpretation of IHL in the military, in general, and during Operation Cast 
Lead in particular: (Recalling specific actions which were highly criticized in view 
of international law) 
 Did you practice IHL in institutions other than the military? (If yes: which institution, 
was IHL understood differently in that context? If no: what are the differences 
between theoretical study of this law to its actual application? How would you 
describe the military application of IHL as compared to other institutions that employ 
this law in their work?) 
 Describe decisions made in regard to the principle of distinction during the operation 
in Gaza. Could you compare the application of this principle during Operation Cast 
Lead to its application in previous military operations? How are these decisions 
made? Could you describe difficult decisions in this regard? 
 Describe decisions made in regard to the principle of proportionality during the 
operation in Gaza. How is the ‘calculation’ for proportionality done? Is there a unified 
code for this calculation? Could you compare the application of this principle during 
Operation Cast Lead with its application in previous ones? 
 Can you describe dilemmas in the work of the department? What were common 
issues of disagreement? 
 Which parts of the work of the department do you consider more in the mainstream of 
legal interpretation, and which relatively less acceptable by legal commentators? Did 
other members of the department make decisions to which you objected? describe 
these 
 Were there any decisions you regret, or that you would not have advised to perform, 
had you known their consequences in advance? 
 Do you consider any parameter other than law to be relevant for the work of the 
department? Are moral arguments taken into account? What is morality in this contex, 
in your opinion? 
2. How does the team work? How is it positioned within the military structure? What 
are its formal authorities? How much power does the team have in practice in military 
decision making?  
 How does the process of real-time decision making process work? 
 Was the team involved in all major decisions during the offensive in Gaza?  
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 In your opinion, is the team involved in decision making in a satisfactory extent?  
 Were you able to veto specific actions? If yes, did you choose to do so? 
 How do you see your role in relation to decision making? (Do team members act as 
advisors or advocates?)  
 Do you think that you hold some responsibility for military actions on which you 
advised? 
 
 
 
 
